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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the health care industry in the United
States underwent significant changes in its quest to reduce rising
health care costs while continuing to provide quality service. Histori-
cally, health care services were provided by a physician in a solo
practice, by a single unaffiliated hospital, and by a traditional indem-
nity insurer.' The emergence of managed care organizations
(MCOs), 2 physician practice management companies (PPMs), 3 hospi-
tal systems,4 and integrated delivery systems (IDS)" changed the
1. See Edward S. Kornreich, Health Care M & A: Commercialization of the Medical
Industry, in HEALTH CARE M&A: COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE MEDICAL INDUSTRY
329, 333 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-741, 1996).
2. MCOs seek to control health care costs while continuing to provide quality care.
They accomplish this by controlling the cost, volume, and type of health care services
their enrollees-individuals enrolled in their health care plan-receive. There are many
types of MCOS-health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organi-
zations (PPOs), and point of service plans (POS). First, HMOs are the most cost effective
and the most restrictive to enrollees, essentially requiring enrollees to receive all of their
health care services within the plan. Enrollees must choose a primary care physician from
among those participating in the plan. Then, the primary care physician will control their
use of medical services within the plan. Second, PPOs are less restrictive, since they allow
enrollees to seek health care outside of the plan for a higher cost and do not require a
physician to control the use of services by a patient. Overall, however, PPOs cost more
than HMOs. Third, POSs are essentially HMOs that cover out-of-plan health services.
POSs require a primary care physician, but they still provide reduced coverage when an
enrollee seeks specific health services outside of the plan. See THOMAS C. FOX ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS MANUAL § 11.02 (1996). When this Com-
ment refers to MCOs, the statement applies to all forms of MCOs. When this Comment
refers to HMOs, the statement specifically addresses HMOs. This Comment will focus on
HMOs, since they are the most controversial and the most mature type of MCO.
3. A PPM provides various types of services to physicians within its network. Some
PPMs are more sophisticated in the services they provide than others. Services include,
but are not limited to, billing, access to sophisticated information systems, and equipment
provisions. See Andrew J. Demetriou, Physician Practice Management Companies:
Structures and Strategies, in HEALTH CARE M&A: COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE
MEDICAL INDUSTRY 605, 609 (PLI Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-741,
1996).
4. A hospital system involves the consolidation, through acquisition or joint venture,
of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, thereby creating financial benefits through
economies of scale, increased purchasing power, and stronger combined volumes. These
benefits give large, for-profit hospital chains a strong competitive advantage over not-for-
profit hospitals. See NATIONSBANK, N.A., HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY REVIEW &
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delivery of health care' in many areas of the country. These new
health care organizations face business, industry, regulatory, and le-
gal risks that may affect their profitability. Prudent lenders will be
concerned about these risks and will incorporate an analysis of them
in their evaluation of potential borrowers. Since part of the lender's
analysis should include an assessment of legal and regulatory risks,
the involvement of attorneys is essential.
This Comment provides a broad overview of the health care in-
dustry with a focus on the business, industry, legal, and regulatory
risks that effect the profitability of HMOs and PPMs. Lenders who
understand these risks will be prepared to-analyze a potential health
care company borrower and to decide, based upon that analysis,
whether or not to extend a loan. With a better understanding of the
industry and its associated risks, attorneys will be more effective ne-
gotiators, contract drafters, and advisors for their clients, whether
those clients are lenders, health care companies, or physicians.
With a view towards providing information to lenders and law-
yers, this Comment will explore the health care industry and the risks
associated with lending to two specific types of health care compa-
nies. First, this Comment will focus on the evolution of HMOs and
PPMs within the health care industry.8 Next, this Comment will focus
on the strategic and financial risks of HMOs and PPMs that must be
OUTLOOK 2ND QUARTER 1996, at 15 [hereinafter NATIONSBANK 2ND QUARTER].
5. An IDS is created in the health care industry when hospitals, physician practices,
individual physicians, and MCOs combine or affiliate. Together these entities become
more competitive, achieve greater financial viability, and improve the quality of services
to patients. See Douglas A. Hastings, Physician-Hospital Integration: Beyond Contracting
Models, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 3, 3-4 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Hastings, Integration].
6. Health care is delivered through several complex segments. The following is a
broad overview of the various segments and where HMOs and PPMs fit in. Health care
providers include: acute care hospitals, rural health clinics, and physician groups-
including PPMs. Post acute care providers include: long-term care, home health care,
rehabilitation, outpatient facilities, and psychiatric care. Third-party payers include: in-
surance companies, Medicaid, Medicare, and MCOs-including HMOs. Suppliers
include: clinical labs, drug makers, pharmacies, and medical supplies. See Fox, supra
note 2, § 16.01-.07. MCOs, such as HMOs, are a hybrid of providers and third-party pay-
ers that are positioned to play multiple roles in health care. They currently dominate
health services in many areas of the country. See id, at § 11.01-.02.
7. Some areas of the country responded to the emergence of managed care more
quickly than others; subsequently, the penetration of MCOs tends to be higher in those
areas. In 1994, North Carolina ranked 37th in terms of HMO penetration by state. See
STANDARD & POOR'S, INDUSTRY SURVEYS HEALTHCARE: MANAGED CARE 6 (Oct. 17,
1996).
8. See infra notes 14-86 and accompanying text.
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assessed by lenders. 9 Both HMOs and PPMs are important to banks,
because they need significant amounts of capital to fuel their acquisi-
tion strategies, to build sufficient information system networks, and
to meet their working capital requirements. '0 This Comment will
then consider the industry, legal, and regulatory risks that may also
affect the profitability of HMOs and PPMs." Finally, this Comment
will consider lessons that might be learned from Coastal Physician
Group in light of the risk assessments discussed in this Comment.
II. PPMs AND HMOs IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
In order to fully assess the risks that may affect the profitability
of HMOs and PPMs, it is important to understand the development
of the current health care system. In that regard, a detailed review of
HMOs and PPMs, which are considered to be two primary compo-
nents of today's health care system, is in order. First, HMOs
emerged in response to the demand by employers and individuals for
lower health care costs.'5 In many states, HMOs successfully pene-
trated the health care market, reaching over twenty percent of the
9. See infra notes 87-178 and accompanying text.
10. Traditionally, lenders provide capital through credit vehicles such as term loans
or lines of credit. It is important to note, however, that many HMOs and PPMs turn to
the capital markets for additional forms of financing. The capital markets provide HMOs
and PPMs with access to investors through the public debt and equity markets. Lenders
such as NationsBank can also provide their clients with access to the capital markets
through their Section 20 subsidiaries-NationsBanc Capital Markets, Inc. See, e.g.,
MEDPARTNERS, INC., 1996 QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 (1996) (describing the use of capital markets financing vehicles).
Both investment bankers and lenders need to understand the business, industry, legal, and
regulatory risks of HMOs and PPMs. This Comment focuses specifically on the risks that
need to be understood by lenders.
11. See infra notes 179-331 and accompanying text.
12. Coastal Physician Group (Coastal) is a PPM that ran into financial trouble in
1995. In 1997, Coastal's financial problems still exist.
13. See infra notes 332-73 and accompanying text.
14. See NATIONSBANK, N.A., HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY REVIEW & OUTLOOK 3RD
QUARTER 1996, at 19 [hereinafter NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER]. Hospital Systems are
the third major component within the health care industry. See id. A discussion of this
complex area is beyond the scope of this Comment.
15. Employers have been the primary driving force behind the growth of managed
care. In the past, many employers paid all of the healthcare premiums of their employees
to insurance companies and MCOs. Presently, many employers require employees to pay
as much as twenty to forty percent of their health insurance premiums. In addition, em-
ployees make co-payments on items such as drugs and office visits, which reduce the costs
to the HMOs and physicians. In the past the average co-payment was five dollars, but
recently it has been increased in many instances to ten dollars. Telephone Interview with
Andy Bressler, Healthcare Analyst, NationsBank, N.A. (Jan. 30, 1997).
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United States by 1994.16 Then, PPMs emerged in response to the
penetration and the power of HMOs and other MCOs." PPMs allow
physicians to band together under professional corporate manage-
ment in order to create efficiencies, increase bargaining power
relative to MCOs, and increase physician profits. 8
A. Emergence of HMOs and PPMs
In the traditional doctor-patient relationship, employers and
employees paid a premium to insurance companies who, in turn, paid
physicians and hospitals on a fee-for-service basis. 9 Therefore, those
physicians who maintained a strong recurring relationship with their
patients by providing quality health care obtained a loyal patient base
that generated strong profits. Each patient was allowed to select his
or her physician; thus, a physician had an incentive to provide quality
services in order to foster a strong relationship with each patient. In
this traditional system, physicians determined health care utilization
and prices, and, by so doing, they collectively proceeded to charge
hundreds of billions of dollars for health services.20 Health care costs
grew from about six percent of gross domestic product in 196721 to
approximately fourteen percent in 1995. 2 Believing health insurance
premiums were too high, employers and unions pushed the health
care industry towards managed care.
MCOs emerged as a way to reduce health care costs by reducing
the price and volume of health care services. 3 They gained direct
access to patients and shifted profits away from physicians. Cost-
conscious employers, who saw health benefits reducing their bottom
16. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 5-6. MCOs cover more than seventy
percent of all employees nationwide. See Leigh Page, Employers Look to Managed Care
to Rein in Benefit Costs, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996, at 5.
17. See Theodore N. McDowell, Jr. & Martin D. Brown, Physician Management
Companies: Just What the Doctor Ordered?, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 3, 3 (Alice G.
Gosfield ed., 1995).
18. See id. at 6.
19. See FOX, supra note 2, § 19.02.
20. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Doc Practice Management Set to Explode; with HMOs,
Hospitals Facing Difficulties Organizing Physicians, Independent Firms See a Huge Op-
portunity, MOD. HEALTH CARE, Aug. 14, 1995, at 26.
21. See Health Care Financing Administration (visited Feb. 5, 1996)
<http:lwww.hcfa.gov/statslstathili.htm>.
22. See Costs: U.S. Health Costs Near $1 Trillion; Public Sector Costs Growing Fast-
est, Health Care Daily (BNA), Jan. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, Health Library,
BNAHLT File [hereinafter Health Costs].
23. See Fox, supra note 2, § 11.02.
1997]
326 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 1
line, fueled the growth of cost-saving MCOs.24 In an MCO structure,
fee-for-service billing is replaced by pre-arranged fee structures and
utilization review procedures. Employers pay a lower premium to
the MCO than they would to an indemnity insurance company."
MCOs then pay physicians and hospitals a lower fee for health serv-
ices or a fixed capitated payment.27
Unlike the relationship between traditional indemnity insurance
companies and physicians, in which the patient selected any doctor
and the insurance company paid the bill, the MCOs' and patients'
relationship with physicians is filled with restrictions. MCOs contract
directly with physicians individually or through Independent Practice
Associations (IPAs), and pay them a reduced fee-for-service.' A
physician's pool of potential patients decreases significantly if the
physician is not a member of a managed care provider network.29 Pa-
tients who are covered by an MCO are limited to selecting among
physicians with whom the MCO contracts in order to receive maxi-
mum coverage under their health care plan."
In the case of HMOs, for example, enrollees receive services
from a group of physicians with whom the HMO contracts. The phy-
sician that a patient selects is known as the primary care physician or
"gatekeeper., 31 In essence, a patient is "locked in" to the HMO.32 In
24. See Bill Alpert, Getting Doctors to Work for You: Physicians are Selling their
Practices; Should We be Buying?, BARRON'S, Aug. 26, 1996, at 15. As of 1995, seventy-
one percent of all workers with employer-provided insurance were enrolled in MCOs.
See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 12.
25. Utilization review is a process by which a third-party payer, purchaser, health
care organization, or utilization review contractor evaluates the necessity or appropriate-
ness of medical care on a case by case basis either before or after the treatment. See
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE
364 (1991).
26. See generally William H. Sage, Health Law 2000: The Legal System and the
Changing Health Care Market, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 18.
27. A capitated payment is a flat fee paid per patient per month to cover specified
health services without regard to the actual number of services provided. See HENRY H.
PERRIT, JR., HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION UPDATE AND ANALYSIS, § 3.10 (1996).
Global capitation from HMOs places physicians or physician groups at risk for all health
services including those provided by subcontractors. See Sage, supra note 26, at 18.
28. See Alpert, supra note 24, at 24. An IPA is similar to a PPM, but the practice
managers merely assist the physicians in their dealings with MCOs and do not acquire the
physician practice. See id.
29. The problem of patient decline looms large for non-affiliated physicians, since a
significant portion of the U.S. population is enrolled in managed care plans. See Fox,
supra note 2, § 11.01.
30. In fact, in order for an employee to receive maximum coverage, the employee
may be required to make co-payments or deductible payments or both for some items.
31. See Fox, supra note 2, § 11.02.
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other words, "if the enrollee chooses to go outside the HMO system
for medical care, he or she typically will be responsible for the full
cost of the service."33 Therefore, a patient will almost always choose
a physician from among the HMO's provider network. Thus, pres-
sure has been placed on physicians to contract with MCOs and to be
placed on their preferred provider lists in order for physicians to re-
tain patients and have access to a larger pool of new patients.
However, revenues received by physicians for services rendered
to MCO patients are, in general, significantly lower than traditional
fee-for-service revenues, thereby reducing a physicians' per patient
profitability. As a result of reducing revenues per patient, physicians
realized that they needed to focus on cost containment.3 4 Many sole
practitioners found cost containment difficult in light of the high
costs associated with running a medical practice.35 Clearly, a physi-
cian practice must receive fees adequate to cover operating expenses
in order to be profitable. Few physicians, however, had the bargain-
ing power necessary to obtain higher fees for services from MCOs.
36
Thus, physicians were forced to accept lower fees in order to gain ac-
cess to patients. These factors illustrate that the physician market
was ripe for integration and consolidation, which led to the emer-
gence of PPMs.
Physicians and physician groups are responding to the power of
managed care organizations by affiliating with PPMs3 7  The PPM
segment of the health care industry is poised for rapid growth. There
are close to 650,000 physicians" in the United States, and less thanfive percent are affiliated with PPMs3 9 In addition, it is estimated
32. See id.
33. Id. In contrast, if the MCO is a PPO, then the patient simply pays more for the
out of plan service. See id.
34. See Julie Johnsson, Solo Practice: Down Not Out, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 19,
1996, at 7 [hereinafter Johnsson, Solo Practice].
35. See id.
36. Physicians are fragmented, with seventy-five percent practicing in groups of ten
or fewer; therefore, physicians have limited or no power against MCOs. See MedPartners
(visited Feb. 4, 1996) <httpi/www.researchmag.comlcompany/profilelcpmptr.htm>.
37. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 3. Affiliation with physician practice
management companies is just one of four primary options. The other options are affilia-
tion with hospitals, affiliation with HMOs, affiliation with insurers, or the "development
of physician-controlled managed care strategies, such as the consolidation of group prac-
tices or the development of physician-governed IPAs and networks." Id.
38. Since approximately twenty percent of physicians work for medical schools and
universities, the actual number of patient care physicians is lower. See American Medical
Association (visited Feb. 5, 1996) <http'l/www.ama-assn.org/meetings/public/i96/reports/
cms9i96.htm>.
39. See Jaklevic, supra note 20, at 26.
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that physicians generate $200 billion"  in revenues each year and in-
fluence up to $800 billion.41 The goal of PPMs is to put doctors back
in charge of medicine by freeing them from the more complex busi-
ness concerns. PPMs purchase the assets and liabilities of the
physicians and, in-turn, provide management services in exchange for
a management fee. The physician practice continues to exist as a
separate legal entity.4 The PPM acts as a middleman between the
MCO and physicians." A PPM will have experience with managed
care markets and access to volume contracts. As a result, physicians
have greater access to MCOs and greater bargaining power with
them.
PPMs provide several key resources to physicians, thereby ena-
bling physicians to increase competitiveness and achieve success in
today's health care environment. First, PPMs provide increased ac-
cess to investment capital necessary to maintain and grow a practice.46
Second, the business and management expertise of PPMs reduces
administrative hassles for physicians.47 Third, PPMs offer physicians
economies of scale, which decreases operating costs and increases
purchasing power with suppliers.4 Fourth, PPMs can provide physi-
cians with access to the powerful information management systems
that increasingly play a central role in the health care industry.49 Fi-
nally, through affiliation with PPMs, physicians are better able to
capture new patients through access to national or regional managed
care contracts and contracting support programs.'
In general, PPMs provide a vehicle through which physicians can
compete for profits against MCOs more equally. Their size empow-
ers them with the economic strength to bargain with MCOs in order
to be certain that the clinics are included on the MCOs' provider lists
40. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 3.
41. See Robert Tomsho, Bonus Babies: 'Free Agent' Doctors are Selling Practices,
Signing Job Contracts Upfront Money Can Be Good, Cost Cutting is Crucial, as Managed
Care Prevails Investors Find a New Vehicle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1996, at Al.
42. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 4-5. After the acquisition, the PPM
serves as a management services organization for the physicians. Id. at 5.
43. See id. at 4.
44. See id. at 8.
45. See id. at 8-9.
46. See id. at 7. A solo or small group physician practice relies on bank debt for capi-
tal, but a PPM has access to the capital markets and is usually large enough to command
more favorable rates on debt from banks.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 8.
50. See id. at 8-9.
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and to allow them to negotiate better fees or capitation arrangements
for the clinics.5 PPMs are positioned to be most effective in markets
in which managed care dominates, especially those in which MCOs
make capitated payments to physicians.52 Often the threshold for
physician integration through the formation of a PPM is met when
capitation reaches twenty percent of the market.53 Therefore, the
growth of PPMs is tied to the growth of MCOs in many markets. 4
PPMs are effectively able to increase profitability when they are
engaged in managed care arrangements through capitation. With
increasing frequency, HMOs are shifting the risk of health care costs
directly to the physicians through capitation, which increases physi-
cians' exposure to the risk of increasing health care costs.5 5 As of
1995, seventy-six percent of primary care physicians, forty-six percent
of specialists, and thirty-four percent of hospitals had some capitated
contracts. 6 PPMs benefit because they usually receive a percentage
of their physicians' income, which may be higher due to their ability
to negotiate better capitation arrangements.5
HMOs and PPMs engage in power struggles for access to pa-
tients and increased profits. Many are for-profit corporate
organizations which are publicly traded. As such, the management of
these organizations must answer to shareholders and Wall Street
analysts. HMOs replace the traditional indemnity insurers and take
58on insurance risk. Simply put, HMOs are profitable when their
costs are less than their premium revenues, and their costs are driven
by the type, volume, and cost of medical care received by their en-
rollees. These medical costs are influenced by physicians, but HMOs
have controlled the costs by paying reduced fees-for-service or capi-
tated payments. PPMs, when they receive global capitated payments
also take on insurance risk. 9 If the type, volume, and cost of the
51. See id. at 7-9.
52. See Jaklevic, supra note 20, at 27.
53. See id.
54. See NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 19.
55. By passing the risk of increased health care costs to the PPM, the MCOs also pass
the ability to increase profits to the PPM. In that situation, the PPM is essentially acting
as an insurance company receiving a capitated premium. For a detailed explanation of
capitation and its consequences, see infra notes 208-19 and accompanying text.
56. See Physician Reimbursement, 1995 HMO-PPO DIG. at 12.
57. In general, capitation arrangements can be particularly profitable for physicians
when a PPM is involved, since the PPM assists the physicians in managing their costs,
which is the key to profitability in a capitation arrangement.
58. However, many indemnity insurance companies are adding HMOs as a product
line.
59. See Sage, supra note 27, at 18.
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health care given to the patients are higher than the capitated pay-
ment, the physician will lose money. Therefore, the organization
which has access to more patients has the potential to be less risky
and more profitable since those patients with higher costs will be off-
set by those with lower costs. In order to gain access to more patients
and increase their efficiencies, power, and profits, these health care
organizations need to grow, and, therefore, they often turn to con-
solidation as their primary growth vehicle.
B. Other Important Current Developments in the Health Care
Industry
The health care industry is moving towards the integration of
health care financing and delivery through IDSs.6° An IDS may in-
clude physicians, hospitals, HMOs, indemnity insurance, and other
additional services.6' There are at least four different categories of
integration occurring simultaneously: (1) hospital collaborations and
affiliations; (2) physician practice integration; (3) physician-hospital
integration; and (4) provider-payer integration.
Financial integration indicates the sharing of profits and losses.6
If segments are financially integrated they are usually operationally
integrated, but the reverse is not necessarily true.64 PPMs provide an
example of financial and operational integration. They organize phy-
sician practices into larger groups and share in the profits and losses
through contractual arrangements with other health care entities and
patients.
Health care providers integrate for strategic, economic, service,
and legal reasons.65 Strategically, providers seek to become owners,
to increase their competitiveness, to strengthen their negotiating po-
sition with payers, to improve the future value of their practice, and
to "strengthen their primary care referral channels." 66 From an eco-
60. See Bert L. Campbell, Financing an Integrated Delivery System, NATIONAL
HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION HEALTH LAW UPDATE AND ANNUAL MEETING 1, 1
(1995).
61. See Gail P. Heagen, Integrated Delivery System Development, in HEALTH CARE
M&A COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE MEDICAL INDUSTRY 567, 569 (PLI Com. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-741, 1996).
62. See Douglas A. Hastings, Developing Integrated Delivery Systems: An ERA of
Change in Health Care Delivery and Financing, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 3, 3 (Alice
G. Gosfield ed., 1994) [hereinafter Hastings, Developing].
63. See Campbell, supra note 60, at 3.
64. See id.
65. See Hastings, Developing, supra note 62, at 7.
66. Id.
330 [Vol. I
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nomic standpoint, providers seek to reduce costs through economies
of scale, to gain better access to capital for expansion and informa-
tion systems, and to increase their profitability. 7 Providers attempt
to improve their service to patients by enhancing their facilities,
gaining freedom from the administrative burdens of the current pay-
ment system, and improving their information systems.6s Legal
exposure is reduced regarding some issues, but integration may actu-
ally increase exposure to anti-kickback or self-referral laws.
In response to eroding income brought about by the power of
managed care, physicians are increasingly pursuing the following in-
tegration strategies: the development of IPAs and other physician
contracting organizations and networks; PPMs; primary care groups;
specialist groups; multi-specialty groups; hospital affiliations through
Physician-hospital organizations (PHOs); and managed care com-
pany affiliations. Some physician affiliations have not been
successful. For instance, many hospitals did not have the manage-
ment expertise to successfully operate physician practices, which
resulted in a widespread lack of success of PHOs over the last several
years." In addition, IPAs have not achieved the level of success at
winning MCO contracts due to lack of management expertise, capi-
tal, and information systems. 70 Due to this lack of success, many
HMOs that had acquired integrated physician practices and hospitals
began selling them off in 1996.'
Another important phenomenon that has occurred in response
to the increased cost of indemnity health insurance and rising health
care costs is the emergence of self-insured employers. Today, many
employers are self-funded,' giving them greater ability to engage in
direct negotiating and contracting for health services with MCOs,
rather than traditional indemnity insurance companies. The cost of
health care coverage for employees is borne by self-insured employ-
ers.73 In order to minimize the costs of self-insurance, the employer
contracts with a third party administrator (TPA), which may be an
MCO, insurance company, or free-standing utilization review com-
pany, to perform utilization reviews.74 The TPA also provides many
67. See iL
68. See id.
69. See NATIONSBANK 2ND QUARTER, supra note 4, at 17.
70. See Jaklevic, supra note 20, at 27.
71. See NATIONSBANK 2ND QUARTER, supra note 4, at 17.
72. See FURROW, supra note 25, at 363.
73. See id.
74. See Mark E. Lutes & Ann Leopold, ERISA Perspectives on Managed Care, in
1997]
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of the other services such as claims processing typically provided by
insurers, but TPAs assume no insurance risk.' The employer com-
pensates the TPA to administer the employer's health plan. The
contractual structure of agreements between the TPA and the em-
ployer along with the compensation creates ERISA issues." In a
utilization review, a TPA prescreens the medical necessity and cost-
effectiveness of specific medical, usually surgical, procedures to be
performed and suggests alternative procedures in appropriate cases.' s
C. The Uniqueness of the Health Care Industry
The health care industry is one of the largest segments in the US
economy, accounting for about one-seventh of the annual gross do-
mestic product.79 The CBO estimated that total national health care
expenditures reached $1 trillion in 1996, and is expected to exceed $2
trillion by 2007.' 0 Federal and state government spending on Medi-
care and Medicaid in 1995 was approximately $350 billion.8 ' The
government has a huge stake in the industry, for financial and social
policy reasons. However, health care service providers are highly
fragmented, and this fragmentation causes inefficiencies, leads to the
increase of health care costs, and, subsequently, is a financial drain on
the federal government.' HMOs are the driving force in the health
care industry's attempt to reduce this escalation of health care costs.
When PPMs band physicians togethe, they reduce physician fragmen-
tation and encourage consolidation, which creates economies of scale
and reduces overall health care costs.
Regulation of the health care industry occurs at the federal and
state level. The federal government commits federal funds to health
care through Medicare and Medicaid, and it has exclusive authority
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 347, 360 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1992). For a discussion of
utilization reviews, see infra notes 179-207.
75. See FURROW, supra note 25, at 363.
76. See Lutes & Leopold, supra note 74, at 361.
77. See it A critical area of law related to self-insured employer plans is ERISA.
For a discussion of ERISA, see infra notes 247-69 and accompanying text.
78. See FURROW, supra note 25, at 364.
79. Health care costs make up fourteen percent of the Gross Domestic Product. See
Health Costs, supra note 22, at 2. That is about one-seventh of the total GDP. See id.
80. See Costs: Private Health Premium Increases Will Average 5.1 Percent, CBO
Projects, Health Care Daily (BNA), Jan. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, Health Library,
BNAHLT File.
81. See Health Care Financing Administration (visited Feb. 5, 1997)
<http:lwww.hcfa.gov/medicarelMedmed.htm>.
82. It is the large percentage of solo practitioners and small group practices that cre-
ate the fragmented physician market.
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over self-insured employers through the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).? In addition, states regulate
health care insurance.' States also license or certify health care fa-
cilities and professionals, but their financial welfare is influenced by
federal reimbursement policies such as Medicaid." For the most
part, the regulation that currently exists was enacted before the push
for more IDSs and the expansion of managed care.86 Therefore, ex-
isting regulations will most likely change in order to accommodate
the emerging health care system. HMOs and PPMs need to be able
to navigate through these regulations and understand when and how
they may affect their future cash flows.
I. BUSINESS LENDING RISKS OF HMOs AND PPMs
A. Reasons HMOs and PPMs Borrow Money
HMOs and PPMs are likely to seek capital in order to grow
through acquisitions, to enhance their information technology infra-
structure, and to meet working capital needsY. When a lender
analyzes a company to determine whether or not to provide financ-
ing--cash is king. Cash flow is especially important for HMOs and
PPMs, because cash is central to their business. They do not invest
cash in machinery to manufacture products, rather they manage cash
flows within the health care system between employers and physi-
cians. Broadly, lenders must focus on operating cash flows. In
addition, lenders must consider the corporate strategy of the poten-
tial borrower along with other factors, depending upon the purpose
and size of the loan.
One of the more likely purposes of a loan to an HMO or PPM is
for an acquisition. Currently, the most prevalent trend in the health
care industry is mergers and acquisitions (M&A) including, specifi-
cally, horizontal consolidation and vertical integration. Horizontalconsolidation occurs when "two entities providing the same product
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). See also Sage, supra note 27, at 10.
84. See PERRIr, supra note 27, at § 4.11.
85. See Sage, supra note 27, at 10-11. See also Fox, supra note 2, § 2.01-.03.
86. See Sage, supra note 27, at 11.
87. HMOs and PPMs provide value through information management, which re-
quires that the HMOs and PPMs operate large, complex information systems.
88. Commonly referred to as EBITDA-earnings before interest, taxes, deprecia-
tion, and amortization.
89. See Sage, supra note 27, at 10.
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... merge"9 in order to create utilization and cost efficiencies
through volume growth. For example, HMOs often seek additional
enrollment through acquisitions in an attempt to become national,
regional, or niche product players.91 "Vertical integration occurs
when two entities at different levels merge,"92 so they can integrate
delivery of health services and/or payment functions. This may be
riskier than horizontal consolidation since it requires management
expertise in more than one of the complex health care segments. In
addition to M&A, health care companies seek and finance joint ven-
tures as a way to integrate services between hospitals, physicians, and
HMOs.93
As a result of the current M&A trend, lenders are often called
upon to value acquisition targets and finance the transactions. Over-
valuation is one of the most common reasons for post-merger
integration failure. The acquiring company is unable to achieve the
cost efficiencies sought from the merger because it paid too much.
With regard to HMOs and PPMs,94 overvaluation results from the
assumption that physician productivity will not be adversely affected
by industry conditions and that the new entity could correctly address
its underwriting risks. An attorney can add value to his or her service
to lenders and to acquiring companies by understanding the business
and industry risks and identifying any legal risks that can hurt the
target company's cash flows. In doing so, the attorney helps to en-
sure that the target company is not overvalued.
B. Health Maintenance Organizations
When a lender considers making a loan to an HMO, it must con-
sider the business risks of HMOs and incorporate an analysis of those
risks in their due diligence of the specific company seeking capital.
An analysis of an HMO should include a look at the following areas:
what type of HMO it is, its corporate strategy, its source of revenues,
its expenses, its cost-control systems, and the key industry drivers
that will effect management decisions. During the course of running
the business, management makes decisions which affect one or more
90. Kornreich, supra note 1, at 333.
91. See NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 7.
92. Kornreich, supra note 1, at 333.
93. See Hastings, Integration, supra note 5, at 3.
94. See generally McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 28-40 (discussing the business
and financial analysis of PPMs and offering a detailed look at valuation along with oppor-
tunity and termination costs). Some of these concepts are also applicable to valuing
HMOs.
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of the areas listed above and can reduce the profitability of the com-
pany.
Enrollment in HMOs was projected to approach sixty-five mil-
lion Americans by the end of 1996, which is twenty-five percent
higher than the fifty million enrolled at the beginning of 1995. 9 It is
important to note, however, that the penetration of HMOs is
stronger in some states-Massachusetts, California, and Minnesota,
for example-than others. 96
In order for HMOs to be successful in the future, they must de-
fine the parameters of their corporate strategy and determine
whether they want to be "[n]ational [p]layers, [d]ominant [r]egional
[p]layers, or [n]iche [p]roduct [p]layers." 97  Players without such
strategies risk being acquired by focused players seeking enrollment
growth. A key growth segment within HMOs is Medicare." As the
federal government seeks to decrease Medicare's growth, it has
turned to managed care programs." The HCFA estimated that as of
October 1, 1996, four million Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in
HMOs, which accounted for only ten percent of total beneficiaries. °°
Before an analysis can be made of the HMO, the lender must
identify the type since it may influence the analysis. There are essen-
tially four types of HMOs outlined in federal regulations. 0' The first
is a staff model HMO, in which the HMO employs its own staff of
physicians and other health care providers and pays them a salary."°
Next is a group practice model HMO, in which the HMO contracts
with a medical group practice and pays a fixed, capitated fee for the
health services provided to the HMO's enrollees.'0 3 The medical
group practice employs the physicians and pays them a salary. °4 As
with the staff HMO, the group practice model HMO's enrollees seek
95. See Julie Johnsson, HMOs Dominate, Shape the Market, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan.
22, 1996, at 1.
96. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 5.
97. NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 7.
98. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 1.
99. See id. at l-2.
100. See For the Record, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 11, 1996, at 16.
101. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.103(a)(1). There are also state regulations that apply to
HMOs. For instance, an HMO must be licensed by the state in which it operates. While
a discussion of state regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to
note that they may need to be reviewed when considering a transaction.
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most of their health services from one location.' The third model is
called the IPA model HMO, in which the HMO contracts with an
IPA or a group of IPAs.'0 6 In the IPA model, physicians maintain
their own practices, and the HMO pays the IPA a reduced fixed fee;
in turn, the IPA pays its physicians on a fee-for-service basis.0 7 The
fourth model is the Contract Model HMO, in which the HMO con-
tracts with individual physicians who maintain their own offices and
private practices.'0 The HMO pays the individual physicians on a
reduced fee-for-service basis or on a capitated fee basis."° In addi-
tion, an HMO can operate any combination of the models."'
HMO earnings are driven by several different factors. Revenues
for HMOs are driven by three groups: large commercial customers
with more than fifty employees, small commercial customers with
fewer than fifty employees, and government sponsored Medicare and
Medicaid recipients."' Competitive pricing pressures have reduced
the premiums received by large commercial customers." 2 At the
same time, HMOs have more flexibility to receive higher pricing
from small commercial customers who are highly fragmented and
geographically diverse. 3 Revenues are driven by the premiums paid
to HMOs per enrollee and the number of enrollees in the HMO.Y4 In
the near future, enrollment frowth will be the primary factor in
earnings increases for HMOs. 5
In addition, in order for an HMO to be profitable, it must be
able to control expenses. An HMO's expenses are composed of
medical costs incurred, the rate of medical cost inflation, and admin-
istrative costs."6 The key indicator of profitability in the managed




108. See id. It is also commonly known as the "Network" model.
109. See Steven Findlay, Can Capitation Save the World, BUS. & HEALTH, June 1996,
at 45.
110. See Fox, supra note 2, at § 11.02.
111. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 1.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 21.
115. See id. at 1. Most of these enrollment gains are expected to come from Medicare.
Id.
116. See id. at 21-22.
117. See id. at 21. The MLR involves the utilization of health care services. Utiliza-
tion is determined by cost and volume. If the utilization is too high, then the MLR could
increase to eighty-five percent to ninety-five percent, thereby making it almost impossible
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MLR is determined by dividing the total amount of direct medical
costs-such as pharmaceuticals, doctors, and hospital-related costs-
by the HMO's premium revenues.' On average, a well-run HMO
should have an MLR of around eighty percent, in which case eighty
cents of every premium dollar is spent on medical costs.1 9 This indi-
cates that the HMO has managed its patient base well and accurately
forecasted the medical service usage of its enrollees.Y2 Remaining
expenses include administrative costs such as marketing, billings and
collections, database management, and customer service."' The
"administrative cost ratio" is determined by dividing the selling, gen-
eral, and administrative expenses by total revenues.Y' This ratio
should not exceed ten percent, but depends on the HMO's operating
and corporate strategies. 3
A well-run HMO incorporates cost-control systems throughout
its organization. Cost controls must be established internally in sev-
124
eral key areas of the HMO. First, there must be an "ongoing
utilization review process for each physician."' Second, "reports
comparing actual service usage and forecast utilization" must be gen-
erated systematically." 6 Third, "hospital usage for individual
patients" must be monitored. 7  Finally, HMOs must control the
number of times "IHMO physicians refer their patients to other spe-
cialists and health care facilities."'"
There are other parts of an HMO's financial statements that
warrant mentioning. First, net profit margins for the HMO sector of
MCOs currently fall in the tight range of two percent to three per-
cent, with several companies reporting net losses.'2 9 Those HMOs
with "large and diverse membership bases" will most likely be more
stable than "smaller HMOs with more focused membership pro-
files. '"3  Second, an HMO's earnings can also be overstated by
for the HMO to be profitable. For a more detailed discussion of utilization as an industry
risk, see infra notes 179-207 and accompanying text.











129. See id at 22.
130. Id.
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inadequate balance sheet "reserves for claims, losses, loss adjustment
expenses, and healthcare services expenses.1 .' Finally, HMOs gen-
erally do not carry large amounts of debt on their balance sheets.'32
Although managed care does not rely on debt financing to the extent
that other industries do and acquisitions are usually financed with
cash or stock, debt is still an option for many HMOs and may become
a greater source of financing in the future.
HMOs are expected to rebound from a weak year in 1996, but
the long term outlook is uncertain.33 HMOs performed poorly in
1996 due to the underwriting cycle, flat premiums, increased competi-
tion, and the coverage of less healthy populations as HMOs increased
their penetration. There is a positive outlook for 1997 in light of an
estimated increase in premiums of two to five percent.135 Over the
long term, the merger frenzy should decrease competition in the
HMO market, resulting in weaker competitive pricing pressures and
higher profits. At the same time, however, the government will most
likely reduce HMO reimbursements on Medicare as a way to trim the
budget.136 Also, providers continue to strengthen their position in the
industry, diffusing the HMOs' ability to realize profits at the expense
of others. In the meantime, HMOs need to concentrate on reducing
sales and administrative costs.
In sum, the financial viability of an HMO can be determined by
looking at several factors. First, the quality of top management is
indicative of the success of an HMO, since they are the decision
makers who influence all other business risks.37 Second, an analyst
needs to identify the breakdown of HMO enrollees by segment, ei-
ther commercial or Medicare/Medicaid, in order to properly examine
131. Id at 22-23.
132. See iAt at 22.
133. See Keith H. Hammonds, Industry Outlook-Services: Health Care, Bus. WK.,
Jan 13, 1997, at 114.
134. See NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 6-7.
135. See Hammonds, supra note 133, at 114.
136. On January 21, 1997, President Clinton announced that his budget would include
$138 billion in Medicare savings over a six year period. His proposal includes a $46 bil-
lion reduction in reimbursements to MCOs over a six year period. See Medicare: Clinton
to Propose $138 billion in Program Savings Over Six Years, Health Care Daily (BNA),
Jan. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, Health Library, BNAHLT File. Notably, on January
27, 1997, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott stated that he favors increasing payments to
HMOs as a way to give beneficiaries the option of enrolling in an HMO and as a way to
continue to increase innovation in health care. See Medicare: Lott Says Medicare HMO
Payments Could be Increased, Health Care Daily (BNA), Jan. 28, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Health Library, BNAHLT File.
137. See Hammonds, supra note 133, at 114.
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the associated risks."8 Third, the HMO should ensure that contrac-
tual agreements with providers and other health care entities enable
it to sufficiently control costs.' Fourth, the geographic areas in
which the HMO currently operates, along with plans for expansion,
affect profitability since some areas of the country have experienced
more HMO penetration than others.' 40 Fifth, the medical loss ratios
and administrative costs must be analyzed since they represent the
largest expenses.'4 Sixth, the amount of income generated from ad-
ministrative fees, interest income, and other sources besides premium
revenues can boost revenues, enabling the HMO to experience
higher profits while taking some of the pressure off of cost-control
initiatives. 42 Seventh, understanding the types of services provided to
enrollees assists the analyst in understanding the potential magnitude
of the health care costs. 43 Finally, the determination of whether the
MCO is able to meet earnings per share (EPS) estimates'" in relation
to total earnings and the number of shares outstanding is a key factor
in determining profitability.
C. Physician Practice Management Companies
When a lender considers making a loan to a PPM, it must con-
sider the business risks of PPMs and incorporate an analysis of those
risks in its due diligence of the specific company seeking capital. An
analysis of a PPM should include a look at the following areas: its
corporate strategy, the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement and
Management Services Agreement, sources of revenue, and expenses.
The decisions management makes regarding these areas affect the
profitability of the company and determine whether the lender is re-
paid.
Before engaging in a detailed analysis of PPMs, it is important to
discuss four critical success factors which should drive management's
decisions. First, the PPM must have the management expertise to
make strategic decisions concerning physician groups within the
138. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 20.
139. See iL
140. See it When there is a significant amount of competition for enrollees among
HMOs, the premiums charged to employers may be reduced or remain artificially stable,




144. See itt If an HMO grows too fast by issuing stock, it can dilute the value of its
stock and EPS.
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managed care system. 45 This includes managing costs through the
use of information systems and managing its relationship with man-
aged care payers.146 Second, the PPM must develop a positive
physician-driven structure and culture. 47 Doctors want to deal with a
company that understands their duties and concerns. The PPM
should not tell physicians how to practice medicine. Third, PPMs
must maximize profits for shareholders." The second and third fac-
tors may conflict since payers, physicians, and shareholders each have
their own objectives. 49 Finally, the overall growth strategy of the
PPM will impact its profitability in the future. Issues such as whether
to diversify, how fast to grow, and how to finance that growth will
impact the future revenues and expenses of the PPM.
In considering what types of physician practices to integrate and
manage, corporate strategy decisions vary widely among PPMs, but
essentially these strategies fall into three broad categories: multi-
specialty, single-specialty, and primary-care physician based.5" First,
some PPMs, like PhyCor, focus on multi-specialty practices and add
primary care physicians.' Second, other PPMs seek to integrate sin-
gle specialty practices such as Physician Reliance Network, which
focuses on oncologists, OccuSystems, which focuses on occupational
health, and Physicians Resource Group, with a focus towards eye
care.'52 Third, other PPMs, such as InPhyNet and Pacific Physician
Services, assemble a core of primary-care physicians, which is diffi-
cult since many practice in small groups or as solo-practitioners. 3 In
addition, hospital-affiliated PPMs such as EmCare organize doctors
within hospitals. 54 It is important to note that some PPMs will seek a
strategic position in more than one segment.
Structuring a PPM-physician relationship generally involves two
principal agreements, the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Man-
agement Services Agreement.' 55  Under the Asset Purchase
Agreement, the PPM purchases the assets of the physicians group





150. See Jaklevic, supra note 20, at 27-30.
151. See i& at 27.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 30-31.
155. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 4-5.
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(the clinic).'56 Payment will be made in cash, PPM stock, debentures,
or a combination of these."7 After the acquisition, the PPM enters
into a Service Agreement with the clinic, which maintains a separate
legal identity.158 Typically, management agreements are long term,
ranging from twenty year terms to forty year terms.'
Under the Management Services Agreement, the PPM provides
not only all of the assets necessary for the clinic to operate, but also
all of the administrative, financial, and management functions for the
clinic.' 6 The PPM furnishes equipment, furniture, offices, "billing
and collection services," "general financial and administrative serv-
ices," "managed care contracting services," and the nonprofessional
personnel working at each clinic. 6 ' For purposes of comparison, phy-
sicians pay their own salaries, the salaries for professional services,
and practice insurance premiums.62 In exchange for these services,
the PPM receives a management fee of approximately eight to ten
percent of physician income.6
The issue of accounts receivables is an especially sensitive one
for PPMs. The management fee received by the PPM is ultimately
paid from the collection of physicians' accounts receivables."36 In or-
der to secure payment of the management fee, the clinic will usually
either assign the receivables to the PPM or give the PPM a security
interest in the receivables. However, a significant liquidity problem
for PPMs is the buildup of accounts receivables. Because PPMs are
growing so rapidly, factors such as the length of time it takes to con-
vert the receivables to the proper billing system and the build up of
receivables due to new contracts cause the overall accounts receiv-
able balances to accumulate, which reduces the speed in which cash is
received by the company' 66 This is one of the reasons PPMs rely so
heavily on working capital lines of credit. Many PPMs suffer from
high receivable balances that turn over into cash slowly.
156. See id. at 4.
157. See id at 11.




162. See id. at 16.
163. See Campbell, supra note 60, at 20.
164. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 17-18.
165. See id.
166. See MEDPARTNERS, supra note 10, at 18.
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Revenues for PPMs are primarily driven by management fees.
Management fees can be structured in different ways, but they are
usually related to physician productivity."' Some PPMs receive a
percentage of gross revenues of the clinic, while others receive a per-
centage of net income before distribution to the physicians."6 In
addition, in states where global capitation arrangements are utilized
by MCOs to pay physicians, the PPM retains a portion of the capi-
tated payment from the MCOs.'69 In such instances, the capitation
fee from MCOs can represent a more significant portion of a PPM's
revenues than the management fee from physicians. The relationship
between the PPM and the clinics will be friendlier if the clinic's incen-
tives and the PPM's incentives parallel one another; otherwise, one
party may seek profits to the detriment of the other party.170
Expenses for a PPM are related to the clinics and the cost of op-
erating the PPM itself. Clinic expenses include salaries and benefits,
supplies, contracted medical services, and other operating expenses."'
PPM corporate expenses include salaries and benefits, the cost of
maintaining adequate information systems, and other general corpo-
rate expenses. The main objective for the PPM is to control the
expenses incurred by the clinics through management expertise, utili-
zation reviews, and the efficient use of information systems to
centralize the administrative functions of the clinics.
In sum, the financial viability of a PPM can be determined by
looking at many factors. First, the ability of the PPM to manage cash
flows and convert accounts receivables into cash quickly is critical for
success. Second, the size of the market share held by a PPM in each
region in relation to competitors is indicative of success.172 Third, a
quality management team with a strong record and physician leaders
who understand the industry and its risks is essential." In fact, since
acquisitions will continue to fuel growth, it is important for manage-
ment to have demonstrated the ability to identify and bring value to
167. Physician productivity is tied to the number of patients with whom a physician
works. In a fee-for-service system, if the physician sees more patients, then the physician
is more productive. Under capitation, the physician is more productive when patients
require fewer services. Essentially, if the PPM is able to run the physicians' practice more
efficiently, then the physicians and the PPM will be more profitable.
168. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 5.
169. Telephone Interview with Andy Bressler, Healthcare Analyst, NationsBank, N.A.
(Jan. 30, 1997).
170. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 16.
171. See id. at 5.
172. See NATIONSBANK 2ND QUARTER, supra note 4, at 17.
173. See id.
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transactions. Fourth, management must not overvalue its acquisi-
tions if efficiencies are to be achieved. 4 Fifth, the PPM must have
strong information systems and administrative expertise. "5 Sixth,
leadership in developing a market is necessary for success.'76 Seventh,
strong and favorable relations with MCOs and other payers such as
employers is essential for the success of the PPM and its physicians."
Finally, the PPM needs to be able to manage capitation.' s
IV. INDUSTRY, LEGAL, AND REGULATORY RISKS OF HMOs AND
PPMs
The purpose of this section is to provide a broad overview of the
various industry, legal, and regulatory issues that may have an impor-
tant impact on the future cash flows of HMOs and PPMs. Due to the
complexity and magnitude of each issue, a full in-depth analysis is
beyond the scope of this Comment; instead this Comment will review
the most relevant parts of each risk.
A. Utilization
Controlling utilization within managed care involves controlling
health care costs by evaluating the necessity and appropriateness of
medical care on a case by case basis, which may hurt the quality of
health care services."' Controlling utilization means controlling the
demand for services by patients.""' HMOs need to maintain a strong
medical cost management program in order to be profitable. When
payments are pre-paid, such as through capitation, HMOs will in-
crease their revenues by reducing their costs, which in this industry
174. See McDowell & Brown, supra note 17, at 11-14.




179. See FURROW, supra note 25, at 364.
180. See id In short, in light of the fact that there are many medical services available
to meet the needs of patients, utilization attempts to find the most cost-effective method
for delivering service, thereby eliminating waste in the health care system and reducing
costs to patients and employers. See id.
181. See Alice G. Gosfield, Is Less Really More? Utilization Management in the 1990s,
in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 89,94 (Alice G. Gosfield, 1996). Primary care capitation is
an incentive offered to physicians to control utilization of health services by placing the
risk of increased costs on those performing the services. See id Another method of con-
trolling utilization pays physicians bonuses to encourage them to use one procedure over
another. See id More methods are likely to appear in the future; nevertheless, the risk
that these methods will not effectively control costs exists. See id.
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means reducing the cost and volume of the medical services1 The
risk lies in the fact that HMOs must control costs in order to be prof-
itable, but if they cut them too much there may be a backlash from
the public, resulting in large jury verdicts against HMOs and PPMs or
in requirements that HMOs provide certain mandatory benefits.
Utilization reviews and compensation arrangements are used by
HMOs and other MCOs to control the cost and volume of health
care services. First, HMOs can monitor care directly on a case-by-
case basis through utilization reviews." In general, utilization re-
views involve the submission of a request for approval of certain
services by the physician to the plan-a doctor working for the plan
makes the decision. Frequently used reviews include "pre-admission
review of non-emergency admission [to a hospital]; concurrent review
of hospital stays; dischargeplanning; ambulatory care review and ret-
rospective claims review. '  Second, compensation is used by HMOs
to control utilization. In compensation arrangements, the health care
decision regarding services a patient should receive is made solely by
the physician.1 The main method of compensation as a way to con-
trol utilization is capitation.186
There are several factors in the health care industry that will
have an impact on the ability of HMOs and PPMs to control utiliza-
tion in the future. First, HMOs are covering less healthy
populations.' When HMOs first began, they attracted young,
healthy enrollees interested in preventive care and prenatal bene-
fits."" As HMO penetration increases, they add enrollees who
require more medical services, thereby increasing utilization and de-
creasing profits. 9  Second, many large HMOs took on large
indemnity populations intending to convert them to managed care,
but the conversion has been difficult to implement and HMOs have
been left with enrollees who have higher utilization costs.19 Third, it
is difficult for HMOs to maintain a strong medical cost management
182. Utilization also refers to the MLR. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
183. See Gosfield, supra note 181, at 95.
184. Id. at 96.
185. See id. at 101.
186. See id. at 102. The revenues are fixed in a capitation arrangement, so physicians
are profitable if they control costs by controlling the utilization of health care services by
patients.
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program when the rate of enrollee growth is high.'9' Average HMO
enrollment growth from January 1995 to January 1996 was approxi-
mately seventeen percent, with some companies growing at faster
rates as high as eighty percent.192 Fourth, pharmaceutical costs may
increase further in the future.93 Finally, the use of POS products by
HMOs is growing, and with these products, HMOs will not have as
much control over utilization and medical costs.' 94 Each of these fac-
tors may result in decreased future cash flows for HMOs.
An issue surrounding utilization is its effect on the quality of
health care. If the public believes HMOs have cut back utilization
too much, then regulators and the courts may intervene, resulting in
increased costs for HMOs and PPMs. 9 State regulators have inter-
vened in many areas including, among others, maternity benefits,
OB/GYN access, anti-gag rules, emergency benefits, and any-willing
provider laws.' 9 In addition, many states require utilization review
organizations (URO) to obtain Utilization Review Accreditation
Commission (URAC) accreditation, while other states at least hold
UROs to the URAC's standards.' 97
The courts have also played a role in monitoring the effect of
utilization management on the quality of health care. The success
of plaintiffs in this area has been slow. For example, in Dunn v.
Praiss,'99 an HMO was held liable for a bad outcome due to a late di-
agnosis of testicular cancer by a urology practice, which had
contracted with an HMO that received capitated payments for its
191. See NATIONsBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 7.
192. See id. at 8.
193. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 10.
194. See NATIONSBANK 2ND QUARTER, supra note 4, at 7.
195. See Gosfield, supra note 181, at 94.
196. See NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 10.
197. See Gosfield, supra note 181, at 107.
198. See id. at 109-11. A detailed discussion of current case law is beyond the scope of
this Comment. The purpose of addressing this issue is to alert the lender or lawyer that
such case law exists. In considering utilization management, a review of the leading cases
relating to the liability of MCOs in this regard would be important. See Wickline v. Cali-
fornia, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, appeal granted, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560, 727 P.2d 753 (1986); Wilson
v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d Supp. 660,271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990); Hughes v. Blue Cross of Northern California, 245 Cal. Rptr. 273, 199 Cal.
App. 3d 958 (1988); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992); Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir.
1993). However, it is important to note that cases involving ERISA plans are difficult to
win. Significantly, ERISA may preempt claims dealing with utilization review issues in
addition to other issues. See infra notes 247-69 and accompanying text.
199. 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1992).
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specialty health services.' The court held that the HMO was respon-
sible for the harmful outcome based on the theories of respondeat
superior or agency as a result of its payment relationship and its con-•- 201
trol over the physician. In situations like the one in Dunn,
physicians are caught in the middle as they try to fulfill their duty to
treat the patient, receive payment for the treatment, and maintain a
positive, profitable relationship with the managed care plan."" In
Hand v. Tavera,0 3 the court held that an on-call primary care physi-
cian who contracts with an HMO owes a prepaid enrollee in the
HMO medical plan a duty of care when the enrollee shows up in a
participating hospital emergency room because a physician-patient
relationship does exist.2°4 Moreover, in Fox v. HealthNet of Califor-
nia, which was a non-ERISA case, an HMO contracted to provide
comprehensive health services, but then denied coverage for an ex-
perimental treatment. 6 The claim filed was a denial of "medically
necessary" benefits as a bad-faith breach of contract, and the suit
yielded the plaintiff an $89 million verdict against the HMO.
B. Capitation and HMOs
HMOs receive prepaid per-person charges for health care serv-
ices from employers, commonly referred to as capitated payments.""6
HMOs assume the financial risk of capitated payments, but they are
also able to reap financial gains by controlling clinical and adminis-
trative responsibilities. Like traditional insurance companies, HMOs
have experience handling capitated payments and insurance risk.
200. See id. at 866,868-69.
201. See id. at 869.
202. See Gosfield, supra note 181, at 118.
203. 864 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. 1993).
204. See id. at 678-79. The physician owed the patient a duty of care even though he
never before saw the patient, because it was in the physician's contract with the HMO to
serve as a gatekeeper for the patient and to arrange for covered health services for the
patient. See id.; see also Gosfield, supra note 181, at 118.
205. No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Riverside County, Dec. 28, 1993) (awarding executor
a verdict for breach of contract).
206. See id; see also Gosfield, supra note 181, at 111.
207. See Fox, No. 219692; see also Sage, supra note 27, at 12. The contract promised to
render comprehensive services for a pre-paid premium. See Fox, No. 219692.
208. See Findlay, supra note 109, at 45. Essentially, the HMO is accepting insurance
premiums from employers and taking on insurance risk. If the health care costs incurred
by enrollees are less than the premiums received, then the HMO makes money; however,
if costs are greater, then they lose money. Thus, it is critical for HMOs to control their
costs. The most significant ways by which the HMOs control costs is through reduced
payments to providers and utilization reviews that control the volume and type of health
services.
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HMOs receive premiums from employers and, in turn, pay pro-
viders on a discounted fee-for-service basis. However, HMOs are
increasingly paying providers on a capitated basis."" This method
seems to transfer the potential for financial gain and control over
medical decisions and costs to providers. Large provider groups and
PPMs are in a position to demand the shift while possessing the ca-
pabilities to handle the risk. On the other hand, solo practitioners
and small groups are hesitant to take on the financial risks of capita-
tion.21° As physicians continue to consolidate, HMOs will most likely
replace more fee-for-service payments with capitated payments.
While this will reduce the financial risk HMOs assume, it may also
211reduce future revenues of HMOs.
C. Capitation and PPMs
Global capitation is a risky proposition for physicians and PPMs
that cannot control their costs. Under a fee-for-service system, the
physician assumes little risk and merely charges a fee which includes
the costs incurred and a profit margin. In contrast, under capitation,
the physician assumes financial risk. If patient costs exceed the capi-
tation amount, the physician must absorb those additional costs,
which may result in losses, and therein lies the risk. Capitation can
also lead to profits, but only if the costs are tightly managed without
impeding the patient's quality of care.
Through their management expertise and information systems,
PPMs are able to manage costs more effectively than solo-
practitioner physicians or physician groups, but the risk of loss still
exists. A report released in 1996 found that more than fifty percent
of physicians receive no income from capitated contracts in recogni-
212tion of the financial risks. Therefore, as the use of capitationbecomes more widespread throughout the United States, the desire
209. See id. A study of 108 MCOs found that only thirty-seven percent of HMOs use
capitation as the primary payment method, whereas sixty percent had partial risk-sharing
arrangements. See id In contrast, 100% of PPOs had risk-sharing arrangements, but only
seven percent of PPOs engaged in capitated contracts with physicians. See id.
210. See id
211. When HMOs pay providers on a discounted fee-for-service basis, they have the
opportunity to make money if they can control the services used by their enrollees. How-
ever, under capitation the HMO receives a fixed premium and pays a fixed per person
capitated payment to the provider. Therefore, the HMO only makes money on the
spread, which means the HMO's survival is partially based on how well it negotiates its
premiums received and fees paid.
212. See id. at 48. Solo practitioners and small physician groups usually prefer to re-
ceive discounted fees-for-service over capitation in recognition of the financial risk
capitation presents. See id.
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of physicians to join PPMs will most likely increase.213 This will in-
crease the number of capitation arrangements the PPM has to
manage for physicians and increase the risk of loss. For example,
lenders should be on the alert when a grovider group's capitated
revenues increase significantly in one year.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of capitation will depend on how
well management and attorneys negotiate individual contracts be-
tween the HMO and PPM.215 There are several key issues to
consider. First, setting the appropriate capitation rates is critical.216
The rates should be in line with the location, age, and health of the
217enrollee population. Second, it is also important to ensure that the
primary care providers are not obligated to perform health services
for which they are inadequately trained or that result in too strenuous
a caseload.21' Finally, look at the size of the PPM to ensure that it is
capable of managing the capitated arrangement. On average the
PPM should strive for 250 capitated lives per physician, but no lower
than 100 lives. 219 Keeping these issues in mind will help mitigate therisk of capitation.
D. Direct Contracting
In an attempt to further reduce health care costs, large corpora-
tions such as Xerox are creating their own HMOs to provide health
care coverage for their employees.220 Buyer's Health Care Action
Group, a coalition of twenty-four large employers in Minnesota, will
be contracting directly with provider groups in 1997. 2 This groupwill function the same as other HMOs in the market, contracting with
213. In the Western United States, fifty-five percent received no capitated income.
See id. In the Midwestern United States, sixty-one percent received no capitated income.
See id. In the Eastern United States, sixty-six percent received no capitated income. See
id. Finally, in the Southern United States, seventy-one percent received no capitated
income. See id. Physicians with little or no current exposure to capitation will be vulner-
able to the risks and may find joining a PPM to be an attractive way to mitigate his or her
financial risks in a capitated arrangement.
214. See id. at 51. A physician group may find a sudden large increase, as little as fif-
teen percent, in capitated revenues difficult to manage resulting in poor health care
decisions in order to remain profitable. See id.
215. See id. at 55.




220. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 3.
221. See Findlay, supra note 109, at 55.
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physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare segments.m In addition,
employers may be able to contract directly with fully integrated hos-
pital chains such as Columbia/HCA HealthCare for their health care
services. m Both of these trends will likely reduce the number of em-
ployees enrolled in HMOs, and, therefore, reduce the profitability of
HMOs.
E. Medicare and Medicaid Reimbursement Risk
Federal MedicareJ 4 and Medicaid m reimbursements are deter-
mined by the Health Care Financing Administration (the HCFA). In
an effort to encourage more managed care providers to include
Medicare recipients, the HCFA began setting what it considers to be
attractive rates.26 Medicare-risk HMOs are reimbursed for each
beneficiary at ninety-five percent of the average fee-for-service cost
of a Medicare beneficiary in the same geographic region. 2 7 However,
a recent HCFA study shows that Medicare HMOs may have, in the
past, been over-reimbursed by as much as seven percent.m
With respect to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, there
are two primary risks for HMOs. First, there is the risk that the
HCFA could reduce the reimbursement rate to HMOs, thereby
placing more pressure on them to control costs or increase premiums
for commercial clients.", As a result of the HCFA study, reimburse-
ment rates may be reduced to eighty-eight percent of fee-for-service
benefits.2- The second risk focuses on the Medicare enrollees.2 1
222. See id
223. See id
224. Medicare recipients include individuals over 65 and disabled individuals. See
Health Care Financing Administration (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http:/Iwww.hcfa.
gov/medicare/medmed.htm>. Only the federal government plays a role.
225. Medicaid assists people with low incomes and resources. See Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http:Ilwww.hcfa.gov/medicare/medmed.
htm>. Both the federal and state governments provide assistance, but Medicaid is run by
the individual states.
226. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 1. The HCFA has been trying to in-
crease Medicare recipient enrollment in HMOs since 1982. The goal is to decrease health
care costs while providing an additional option for health care. See id. at 2.
227. See id. The rates are also adjusted for gender, age, reason for entitlement, and
institutional status. See id.
228. See id.
229. In fact, the current version of the 1998 budget proposal contains such reductions.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
230. This is the difference between the current ninety-five percent reimbursement less
the suggested seven percent overcompensation. See supra notes 226 and 227 and accom-
panying text.
231. Not only is the federal government seeking to increase enrollees, but in addition,
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Even if the reimbursement rate remains steady, the HMOs will
quickly exhaust the supply of healthy Medicare recipients." There-
fore, HMOs will be compelled to enroll less healthy recipients which
will increase their utilization and decrease their profitability.
F. Mandatory Benefits and Anti-managed Care Laws
HMOs achieve cost efficiencies by controlling the utilization of
health care services. However, recently there has been a backlash by
the states and the federal government against some utilization con-
trol efforts. Such efforts are perceived by many to result in a reduced
quality of health care services for HMO patients. Thus, state gov-
ernments are increasing mandates on all health plans to provide for
additional services. 3 In addition, in 1996 the federal government
took on a larger role when President Clinton established a new com-
mission to examine issues related to the quality and the growth of
managed care.23 These state and federal governmental actions are a
result of public perceptions about managed care systems. Whether or
not these perceptions are true, the end result is increased costs for
HMOs and reduced cash flows.
Currently, two issues seem particularly important to the public-
maternity benefits and mental health provisions. For instance, in
1995 and 1996, twenty-nine states passed legislation that mandated
coverage for extended stays in the hospital for women after giving
birth. 23 In addition, in 1996 the federal government expanded that
236coverage to all fifty states. Prior to these government mandates,
HMOs provided coverage for only short hospital stays, as little as
twenty-four hours, which the public labeled "drive-through deliver-
ies. '237 The new mandatory coverage for mothers and newborns
requires HMOs to pay for at least forty-eight hours in the hospital for
a normal delivery and ninety-six hours for a cesarean.38 The result of
these laws is increased costs for HMOs, which will decrease their
profitability unless they raise the premium rates charged to employ-
the American Association of Retired People will begin marketing Medicare HMO cover-
age to its members in 1997. See NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 12.
232. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 7, at 2.
233. See NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 10.
234. See id. at 9.
235. See id. at 8.
236. See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1997 Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935,
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996.
237. See Gosfield, supra note 181, at 93.
238. See Newborn Act at 110 Stat. 2936.
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ers.2
9
The quality of care surrounding mental health services and man-
aged care is also a growing issue of concern. In recent years, most
employers have moved their employees to managed health plans for
mental health services.2° Thus, these plans, which are essentially
HMOs, decide both the amount of care and the provider of that care.
This has resulted in more drug treatments and shorter inpatient and
outpatient care.24 As of November 1996, two states had passed men-
tal health benefits legislation mandating that health plans pay for
242
additional services. Once again, state regulations are increasing the
health care costs of HMOs.
Many states are contemplating anti-managed care legislation. In
the November 1996 election, California and Oregon placed anti-
managed care initiatives on their ballots.243 Although these initiatives
failed, the propositions were able to garner between thirty-five and
forty percent of the popular vote.2" These propositions included pro-
visions concerning utilization reviews, health plan fees, justification
for increased premiums, provider termination, and health care pro-
211vider compensation. Interestingly, the Texas legislature is also
considering a proposal to hold managed care plans liable for medical
malpractice, and Massachusetts may require new health plans to be
246not-for-profit.
G. ERISA
In many cases, an HMO is able to escape potential liability from
state tort and health reform laws due to ERISA. However, the safety
that ERISA afforded HMOs in the past may not be as secure in the
future as Congress imposes substantive requirements and the courts
narrow the focus of ERISA with respect to state laws that "relate to"
ERISA health plans.247 Therefore, in the future, HMOs may find
239. Realistically, when costs are passed on to employers, they will merely shift the
cost to employees requiring them to pay a larger percentage of their health care premi-
ums or higher co-payments.
240. See Carol Hymowitz, Shrinking Coverage: Has Managed Care Hurt Mental
Health Care? It Depends on Who You Ask, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1996, at R19.
241. See id.
242. See NATIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 8.
243. See id. at 9.
244. See id. at 9-10.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See Robert L. Roth, ERISA: The Wild Card in the Health Law Deck, in HEALTH
LAW HANDBOOK 191,191-92 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1996).
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themselves open to increased liability and damage awards. Adminis-
trative costs may also increase as HMOs seek to tighten utilization
review procedures.
ERISA is a federal law that applies when employee welfare
benefit plans, including health coverage, are self-insured by employ-
ers.24' Any state laws which "relate to" any employee benefit plan,
such as state-mandated benefit laws or restrictions on policy exclu-
249sions, are preempted by ERISA. Many state legal remedies such as
bad-faith breach-of-contract claims and emotional distress claims
cannot be brought against ERISA plans or the MCOs with whom
employers contract. Plaintiffs can only proceed with an action
against a wrongly denied benefit, and, in those cases, punitive dam-
ages cannot be awarded.25' The purpose of ERISA is to provide
uniform administration of employee benefit plans across the nation
and to free employers from the administrative hassle of ensuring
compliance with conflicting state laws.22 Employers are not required
to provide any substantive health coverage under ERISA. In fact
they are given great latitude with respect to health benefits. 1 3
Many of the state laws preempted by ERISA are not replaced
with equivalent federal laws, creating an "ERISA vacuum." This
"vacuum" reduced regulations of health benefit plans that were self-
insured and helped fuel the growth of managed care.2 5 Congress has
not taken steps to close the "vacuum," but courts have addressed this
issue.2 6 As a result of the 1995 Supreme Court decision in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers In-
surance Company,257 MCOs, including HMOs, may be open to
248. See Sage, supra note 26, at 11-12.
249. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
250. See Sage, supra note 26, at 12.
251. See id.
252. See Roth, supra note 247, at 191.




257. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995). The court held that New York State's hospital surcharges
collected from patients, whose health plans were governed by ERISA and whose HMO
membership fees were paid by an ERISA plan that was designed to fund uncompensated
care, did not "relate to" employee benefit plans as described in ERISA and therefore
were not preempted. The surcharges only indirectly affected the prices of insurance poli-
cies. See id. at 1672, 1683. The significance of this case is that it narrows the
circumstances under which a state law may relate to a plan, thereby freeing many state
laws from preemption and allowing a violation of state laws to be litigated against an
ERISA plan violator.
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increased liability in the future.5' In addition, Dukes v. U.S. Health-
Care, Inc.59 appeared to open the door, at least in the Third Circuit,
for increased state court litigation where the quality, not quantity, of
health care is at issue with respect to HMO-induced provider behav-
ior regarding services.26° In essence, ERISA MCOs may be liable
under state tort laws for their role as arrangers for medical care.2"
Plaintiffs will also seek to hold MCOs liable for corporate negligence
and vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of physicians con-
tracting with them.2 2
The tort liability to which an HMO may be subject depends on
the role that the HMO plays with respect to the employer. An HMO
can play two important roles with respect to ERISA plans: health
plan administrator and URO. 63 ERISA usually protects an HMO in
its role as a plan administrator.2 Another challenge involves claims
against administrators of plan benefits. 26' An HMO may also be li-
able as a utilization review agent.65 The case law regarding the
preemption of state tort law claims is unsettled, but so is the case law
relating to the preemption of state health reform initiatives. 67 "It
seems that state attempts to regulate insured plans as part of general
state regulation of insurance will be 'saved' from preemption under
certain circumstances. However, attempts to regulate both insured
and self-insured ERISA plans by broadening the scope of insurance-
type laws to self-insured plans have not been saved from preemp-
tion."'65 In general, ERISA will almost always preempt state law, but
this area of the law opened up in 1995, leaving practitioners with less
258. The main issue of contention between state laws and ERISA preemption gener-
ally involves state laws that do not directly regulate ERISA plans, but that do,
nonetheless, effect the plan. See Roth, supra note 247, at 191.
259. 57 F. 3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995).
260. See Sage, supra note 26, at 13.
261. See Roth, supra note 247, at 200. The Supreme Court addressed whether or not
state tort actions against ERISA plans were preempted by ERISA in Macky v. Lamier
Collection Agency & Service, Inc. 486 U.S. at 833.
262. See id. at 202.
263. See id. at 203-05.
264. See iL at 203. See also Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993).
265. See Roth, supra note 247, at 204. The circuit courts are split on this issue. See id.
266. See id. However, most courts follow the holding of Corcoran v. United Health-
Care, Inc. 965 F. 2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). The court held that ERISA preempted a claim
for injury allegedly caused when a plan's utilization review agent refused to certify a hos-
pital stay. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321. The court recognized that this decision
essentially left the plaintiff without a remedy. See id. at 1338.
267. See Roth, supra note 247, at 206.
268. ld. at 206-07.
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certainty.269
H. Fraud and Abuse
Fraud and Abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid arena is a very
serious matter. The HCFA, through the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral,27° actively seeks out fraud, and, in 1996, it increased the number
of enforcement officers and the amount of money committed to de-
271 272tecting fraud.27' The penalties issued by the HCFA can be severe,
as shown by the two largest health fraud cases: National Medical En-
terprises,273 which had to pay $379 million in 1994,24 and Caremark,
Inc., which had to pay $161 million in 1995.276 There are two spe-
cific types of health related fraud that lenders and attorneys need to
be aware of-anti-kickback rules and self-referral bans-in addition
to a more general type of fraud-false claims. In order to prevent
fraud and abuse, companies should implement corporate compliance
programs. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 greatly affected health fraud and abuse issues, so it warrants a
269. See id. at 205.
270. The Department of Justice is involved in many of these cases.
271. On August 21, 1996, Congress adopted the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, and, in so doing, increased funding for the Fraud and Abuse
Control Program. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191. See also Thomas S. Crane et al., Congress Strengthens Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Juggernaut, 5 Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1399 (Sept. 19, 1996). The fed-
eral government estimates that at least ten percent of all health care transactions,
approximately $80 billion, have a fraudulent element. See Eugene Tillman & Kathleen H.
McGuan, Corporate Compliance Programs under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 255,255 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995) [hereinafter Tillman &
McGuan].
272. Organizations convicted in federal court of criminal health care offenses face stiff
penalties under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. See Tillman &
McGuan, supra note 271, at 256.
273. See NME to Pay $379 Million in Penalties under Settlement with Federal Agencies,
3 Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 917 (July 7, 1994). NME settled with the Justice
Department for criminal fines, civil damages, and penalties. Fraudulent practices at
NME's psychiatric and substance abuse facilities included unnecessary patient admissions,
extended hospital stays to increase insurance coverage, billing insurance companies for
the same service multiple times, and billing Medicare for payments to doctors to induce
referrals of patients to its facilities. See id.
274. See id.
275. See Caremark to Pay $161 Million to Settle Fraud, Kickback Cases, 4 Health Law
Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 953 (June 22, 1995) [hereinafter Caremark]. Caremark settled
civil and criminal claims for kickback and fraud charges after the company made pay-
ments to physicians in order to have business referred to it. They also submitted false
Medicare claims. See id. Caremark is an especially good example for this Comment since
it was a PPM before it was acquired by MedPartners in 1994.
276. See id.
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brief discussion. ' Lenders are vulnerable to the financial conse-
quences of fraud and abuse their borrowers, but a thorough due
diligence investigation and candid discussions with attorneys and
management can mitigate this risk.
Congress enacted the anti-kickback statute as part of the Medi-
care and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987.278 It
essentially prohibits payments or the solicitation of payments related
to the delivery of health care services covered by certain federal and
state health care programs made willfully or knowingly in exchange
for patient referrals.2"9 The case law under the anti-kickback statute
demonstrates that this law is applied broadly and is very fact-
specific."' However, the statute also includes five statutory excep-
tions to the anti-kickback prohibitions, such as payments to bona fide
281 282employees.2s Safe-harbors are also available under the statute. If a
transaction does not fall within one of the exceptions or safe-harbors,
the company could be subject to criminal and civil penalties and ex-
clusion from Medicare, Medicaid, and other federally funded health
care programs. Therefore, attorneys should carefully review rele-
vant transaction documents, and lenders should obtain specific
representations from the management of the borrower that addresses
these issues.2
The federal self-referral bans began under the Ethics and Patient
Referrals Act within the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989.2" It prohibited the referral of Medicare patients to a clinical
lab in which the physician or a family member had a financial inter-
est.2 The ban was extended to cover ten additional health care
277. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1991.
278. Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680,697 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)).
279. See id.
280. See Fox, supra note 2, §§ 4.01, 4.03-.04. One of the leading cases in this area that
illustrates a broad interpretation of the statute is Hanlester Network v. Shalata. 51 F.3d
1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "knowing and willful" under the anti-kickback
statute requires the defendant to "(1) know that § 1128B prohibits offering or paying
remuneration to induce referrals, and (2) engage in prohibited conduct with the specific
intent to disobey the law").
281. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (1994).
282 See Fox, supra note 2, § 6.01.
283. See id. § 4.03.
284. See id § 4.06. In addition, abusive marketing practices such as high pressure sales
tactics can result in kickbacks or false claims. See id. § 4.01.
285. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106,2236, § 6204 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn).
Commonly referred to as Stark I.
286. See id.
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services under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993."' In
addition, the Social Security Amendments of 1994 amended the list
of designated health services covered under Stark II.a The statute
also contains exceptions as to when a physician can refer a patient for
services to an entity in which he holds a financial interest. Penalties
include denial of payment, the return of any moneys received, civil
penalties of up to $15,000 per referral, and exclusion from the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs. °
The False Claims Act (the FCA) 91 makes it illegal to fraudu-
lently claim payment from the U.S. government.292 The FCA applies
293
in civil and criminal actions. Private persons can bring suit under
the act on behalf of the United States.24 The plaintiff must plead the
allegation of fraud distinctively, and he must also present sufficient
facts to create a reasonable inference of fraud."' However, the FCA
prevents qui tam actions in two instances. The first instance occurs
when the action is based on conduct currently in litigation and the
government is a party.2 6 A qui tam action is also prevented when the
action is based on the "public disclosure" of conduct. In this case no
action can be brought unless the Attorney General brings the action
or the individual in the qui tam suit is the "original source., 297 A
287. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 596, § 13562. (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn).
Commonly referred to as Stark II.
288. Pub. L. No. 103-432, 108 Stat. 4398,4436, § 152 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994). See also 1993-1994 Developments in Health Care
Fraud and Abuse, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 271, 295 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995)
[hereinafter 1993-1994 Developments].
290. See 1993-1994 Developments, supra note 289, at 326.
291. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
292. See id. The Attorney General investigates violations under § 3729. See id.
293. See Robert W. McCann, Qui Tam actions Under the Federal False Claims Act:
"Quod quisquis norit in hoc se exerceat," in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK, 67, 67-68 (Alice
G. Gosfield ed., 1992). There is a substantial amount of qui tam litigation in the health
care industry given the government's significant role in the industry and the industry's
focus on fraud and abuse issues. See id.
294. A private plaintiff is called a "qui tam" plaintiff and is also referred to as the
"relator," since the government has the real party interest. The rules for a private plain-
tiff are contained in section 3730 of title 31 of the United States Code, and were first
included in the 1986 amendments. See McCann, supra note 293, at 67-68.
295. See id. at 79-80. This is essentially the standard articulated in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). An allegation that amounts to a mere suspi-
cion of fraud is inadequate. See id; see also United States ex reL Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga.
1990), later decision, 755 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
296. See McCann, supra note 293, at 71.
297. See id. The original source is an individual possessing "direct and independent
knowledge" of the claim who has provided the information to the government voluntarily.
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health care company may commit a false claims violation in conjunc-
tion with an anti-kickback or self-referral violation.29
Organizations can mitigate the severity of any sanctions by com-
plying with the Guidelines for Organizations.2 " The most significant
mitigating factor outlined in the guidelines is the maintenance of a
corporate compliance program which is designed to prevent and de-
tect fraud.3°  A corporate compliance program reduces possible
criminal activity and economic losses due to criminal activity in the
organization."' An effective compliance program includes the items
listed in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. 2
First, the organization must designate a group of individuals to
establish compliance standards and procedures which conform to in-
dustry practices. 33 The second guideline that must be met is to
designate a corporate executive to oversee the compliance program
as a compliance coordinator. This person must report to the Board
of Directors on a regular basis.30 Third, the organization must meet
its duty of care obligation not to delegate decision-making authority
to employees likely to commit criminal acts. 05 Fourth, the compli-
ance standards must be written, disseminated to employees, and used
as the basis for ongoing compliance training programs.0 Fifth, the
organization must strive to achieve actual compliance by utilizing,
monitoring, and auditing the systems.30 In addition, employees must
know how and where they can report fraud violations anony-
See id.
298. Caremark, Inc. plead guilty to criminal kickback and fraud charges, and also set-
tled in order to resolve civil claims for the submission of false Medicaid claims among
other fraudulent practices. See Caremark, supra note 275, at 953.
299. See Tillman & McGuan, supra note 271, at 256. The U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, which created the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, was established by Congress as part
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994). The
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines originally applied to individuals, but the guidelines were
amended in 1991 to include the Guidelines for Organizations, which applies to all busi-
ness entities including, but not limited to, corporations, partnerships, and pension funds.
See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8Al.1-8E1.3 (1996) (setting forth the
guidelines for sentencing organizations).
300. See Tillman & McGuan, supra note 271, at 256.
301. See id. In the settlement between the government and NME Psychiatric Hospi-
tals, Inc., the government imposed the establishment of a compliance plan. See id. at 258.
302. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5.
303. See Tillman & McGuan, supra note 271, at 260-61.
304. See id. at 261.
305. See id. at 262. The organization must perform due diligence to determine who
such likely individuals are by screening applicants and asking them about past criminal
activities. See id.
306. See id. at 263.
307. See id. at 264.
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mously?3 Sixth, the standards must be consistently enforced
throughout the organization. "' This enforcement includes adequate
discipline of individuals who commit a violation and also punishment
310for those who fail to detect a violation. Seventh, the organization
must be able to respond appropriately when a violation occurs."' Fi-
nally, the organization must ensure that it retains all necessary
312documents relating to the compliance program.
The federal government continues to directly address fraud and
abuse issues even though it provides incentives for companies to im-
plement compliance programs as a way to reduce fraud and abuse.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
contained many new fraud and abuse provisions. The first provision,
the Fraud and Abuse Control Program, attempts to eliminate fraud
and abuse through such vehicles as audits, investigations, and the
313creation of new safe harbors. Second, the Medicare Integrity Pro-
gram provision of the Act enhances and centralizes Medicare
314program functions. Third, the Act expands the coverage of fraud
and abuse laws.315 Not only are Medicare and Medicaid covered, but
all federal health plans and some private health plans are also cov-
ered.316 Fourth, the Anti-Kickback provision includes an additional
exception for "entities that have 'risk sharing' arrangements that
place the other party at 'substantial financial risk' in utilizing items or
services., 317 Finally, the Act adds a new category to the Federal
Health Care Offenses.318 The crimes which make up this new cate-
gory include: health care fraud, health care theft or embezzlement,
false statements made in a health care context, obstruction of an in-
vestigation, and money laundering.3 9
308. See id.
309. See id. at 266.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 267.
312. See id. at 269.
313. See Crane, supra note 271, at 1399.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 1400.
316. See idL
317. Id.
318. See id. at 1401.
319. See id.
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I. Antitrust
Attorneys and lenders also need to be familiar with antitrust
laws. Antitrust will be a crucial issue as the health care industry con-
solidation trend continues. A key development in the area of health
care antitrust laws occurred on August 28, 1996, when the U.S. De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission released their
new guidelines entitled "Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy
in Health Care" (Guidelines).32 The most significant changes in the
new release related to physician networks and multi-provider net-
works, both of which contract with MCOs to provide physician and
321other health services.
A meaningful change involved the extension of the "rule of rea-
son" analysis to non-financially integrated provider networks.
This change took place because groups like the American Medical
Association (AMA) argued that antitrust laws discouraged providers
from forming networks that would improve quality assurance and
utilization reviews.324 The AMA pointed out that if non-financial
networks do not have programs designed to achieve quality assurance
and utilization reviews, the network will be illegal per se for price
fixing. 
3
These new antitrust guidelines will most likely result in struc-
tural changes to the health care industry which will create
opportunities for attorneys and lenders. For example, many health
attorneys believe that this legislation will increase the formation of
provider networks because physicians will be more confident as to
their legal position under the new antitrust laws. 32' Physicians cannow engage in additional activities such as competing against HMOs
320. Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, Issued by the Justice
Department and Federal Trade Commission, Aug. 28, 1996, 5 Health Law Rep. (BNA)
No. 35, at 1295 (Aug. 29, 1996) (containing the full text of the new guidelines that replace
the guidelines previously issued on September 27, 1994).
321. See William G. Kopit & Tanya B. Vanderbilt, The New Federal Health Care An-
titrust Guidelines, 5 Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1365 (Sept. 12, 1996).
322. See id. A "rule of reason" analysis looks at an agreement and weighs the pro-
competitive effects against the anti-competitive effects and disallows agreements that are
anti-competitive in nature. Under the prior rules many of these agreements would have
been illegal per se. See id.




326. See Jeannine Mjoseth, Rule of Reason Analysis Seen Spurring Rapid Growth of
Networks, 5 Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1335 (Sept. 12, 1996).
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for managed care contracts.327 In addition, the new guidelines expand
the types of financial integration allowed to physicians in rural, less-
competitive areas, and they allow networks to contract directly with
self-insured employers without facing regulation as insurers.3
J. Corporate Practice of Medicine
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prevents corporate
organizations from offering medical services through licensed physi-• 329
cians. This doctrine may become an issue when physician practices
are acquired or when an HMO contracts with a physician or physi-
cian group for health services.33  A violation of this doctrine can
result in professional discipline of the physicians, and it may even
subject the officers or directors of the corporation to criminal penal-
ties.33" ' Therefore, when drafting a contract between physicians and
corporations, attorneys should review the specific state laws which
address this issue.
V. A LESSON FOR BANKERS AND ATTORNEYS: COASTAL
PHYSICIAN GROUP
Coastal Physician Group, a North Carolina-based PPM, was ex-
tremely successful as of 1994.33' However, as a result of
management's strategic decisions and other market factors, the com-
pany has not been profitable since the first quarter of 1995, and it is
currently seeking a buyer or merger partner.333 In fact, throughout
1996 Coastal sold assets in order to repay lenders $40 million due on
January 2, 1997 . Coastal is a victim of an uncertain and volatile
health care industry which currently believes that growth through
327. See id.
328. See id. at 1335-36.
329. See FOX, supra note 2, § 10.01. The doctrine states that corporations and other
unlicensed persons or entities may not practice medicine through licensed employees. See
id. § 10.02.
330. See id. § 10.01.
331. See id.
332. See Robert Lowes, Will Low Tide for Coastal Leave Doctor's Beached?, MED.
ECON., July 29, 1996, at 31. Coastal grew from revenues of $161 million in 1990 to $749
million in 1994, and in 1994 the stock traded between $26 and $42 a share. See id.
333. See David Ranii, Coastal Losses 2nd-Largest Ever, NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov.
15, 1996, at 9C. Coastal hired Smith Barney to seek a buyer for its core physician contract
business for emergency rooms in order to raise cash to meet its near-term cash needs and
its 1997 debt payment of $78 million. See Kyle Marshall, Coastal says it is in Cash Crisis,
NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 6, 1997, at 8C-9C [hereinafter Marshall, Cash Crisis].
334. See Marshall, Cash Crisis, supra note 333 at 9C. Coastal met this debt obligation
on time. See id. The assets sold included clinics, physician practices, and HMOs. See id.
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acquisition and integration are necessary for survival.
This acquisition frenzy and push towards integration of health
services creates opportunities for companies, but also increases their
financial and legal risks. For example, companies can grow within
their core strategic segments or they can diversify by entering into
new segments of the industry. Diversification can be a risky strategy
since each segment of the health care industry is extremely complex
and the interaction between each segment is changing rapidly every
year. For Coastal, a diversified acquisition strategy contributed to
the company's bleak financial situation.335 Coastal illustrates the po-
tential vulnerability in PPMs and the potential danger a PPM faces
when it diversifies quickly into HMOs.
Coastal was founded in 1977, and went public in 1991.336 In the
early 1990s Coastal was a leader in the PPM industry and built a net-
work of physician practices.337 However, Coastal's successful original
corporate strategy, which is still its core business, was managing and
staffing hospital emergency rooms with specialists such as obstetri-
cians.3 As it diversified, Coastal added a medical malpractice
insurance company and began providing services such as billing and
bill collections 39 From 1986 to 1990, Coastal's net operating revenue
increased thirty percent annually.'
In 1991, Coastal embarked on a new strategy in recognition of
the fact that the number of hospitals, Coastal's major clients, were
decreasing as a result of consolidation.34' This new strategy was the
acquisition and management of physician practices? 42 Coastal be-
lieved that physicians could only control access to patients by
consolidating against MCOs, insurers, and hospitals.343 In addition,
Coastal thought that the physician practices benefited from profes-
sional management skills, economies of scale, and centralized
billing.:44 Because of this belief, Coastal established a relationship
with Humana, an HMO, and acquired up to one hundred physician
335. See id. at 8C.
336. See Nikhil Deogun, Bitter Medicine: Network of Doctors, Touted as a Panacea,
Develops Big Problems, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1996, at Al.
337. See id. at Al, A6.
338. See id. at Al.
339. See id.
340. See Lowes, supra note 332, at 32.
341. See Deogun, supra note 336, at Al, A6.
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practices which serviced Humana's enrollees.345 Coastal's new strat-
egy seemed to be extremely successful-by 1994 Coastal's revenues
increased to $749 million from $161 million in 1990.3
However, in 1994, there were signs that Coastal's PPM strategy
was failing to achieve all of the efficiencies it sought, in part because
of the power of HMOs. 7 Thus, Coastal acquired HMOs as part of its
new diversification strategy. The company purchased several HMOs,
including an HMO in Southern Florida, where Humana had a strong
presence. 4 By choosing to go head to head with its most significant
PPM client, Coastal isolated Humana and became its competitor. At
this time, Humana accounted for twenty-six percent of Coastal's
revenues. 349 The deterioration of this relationship resulted in a flood
of red ink at Coastal.3 °
Coastal made many mistakes in its attempt to lead physicians
into a health care revolution against managed care.35 These mistakes
can serve as lessons for PPMs, bankers, and attorneys.
First, Coastal's acquisition strategy created a complex company
which lacked integration. Coastal grew too fast, which resulted in the
inability to integrate its physician practices into the company's sys-
tems.352 Coastal also failed to adequately integrate its diversified
divisions into a comprehensive corporate strategy. 3 Furthermore, in
attempting to grow, Coastal gave too much away in its contracts.354
For example, it agreed to accept payments based on the amount of
business in the emergency business versus the low-risk traditional flat
rate per physician method.355 The company also did not anticipate
345. See id. at A6.
346. See Lowes, supra note 332, at 31. Coastal's market value peaked at $900 million,
which was six times it market value three years earlier. The stock traded as high as $42 a
share in 1994, but by September 25, 1996 the value collapsed to $6.25 a share. See
Deogun, supra note 336, at A6. In early February 1997, Coastal's stock closed at $2.75 a
share. See Marshall, Cash Crisis, supra note 333, at 8C.
347. See Deogun, supra note 336, at A6.
348. See Heather Harreld, Tracking Coastal Hospital Deaths add to woes of Durham
firm that once wowed Wall Street Investors, TRIANGLE Bus. J., Apr. 26, 1996, at 47.
349. See id.
350. See Lowes, supra note 332, at 34.
351. See id. at 31.
352. See id. at 33. In addition, the absence of a single computer system caused Coastal
to lose track of its receivables and payables, so they were not able to react to slow collec-
tions. See Kyle Marshall, Winning Control of Coastal, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 25,
1996, at 2F [hereinafter Marshall, Control]. This can result in cash flow problems.
353. See Marshall, Cash Crisis, supra note 333, at 8C.
354. See Marshall, Control, supra note 352, at 2F.
355. See id.
[Vol. I
HEALTH CARE RISK ANALYSIS
losses in its original business of supplying emergency-room doctors to
hospitals.56
The second mistake that Coastal made was that it underesti-
mated the power of HMOs in light of the fact that it is cost and not
quality that drives most employer health care decisions.35 HMOs
wield the power since they control the direct access to patients
through their relationship with employers. Coastal believed in the
underlying philosophy of most PPMs, that groups of doctors could
match the power of HMOs.358 The company began to diversify its
strategy, which led them into the HMO business from which Coastal
suffered heavy losses."9
Coastal's third mistake involved the arrangement of capitated
contracts with HMOs to care for enrolled patients, which meant that
Coastal bore the risk if the costs for care rose above the fixed, capi-
tated rate.36°  Coastal's profits were squeezed by Humana, the
physician practices' most significant client, after Coastal purchased
an HMO which was a direct competitor of Humana in Southern
Florida?6 Humana increased the services it offered to its plan mem-
bers in order to make their HMO more attractive. 62 Humana also
decided to no longer charge its patients a five dollar per drug pre-
scription co-payment, and Coastal had to pick up the tab. Humana
then increased the number of physicians in its network which reduced
the number of patients that Coastal's PPM physicians had access to
for treatment.3  It appears that Coastal's contracts with Humana
were not drawn up to protect it from these practices, and, further-
more, that in negotiations neither Humana nor Coastal had specified
the rights of either party with respect to non-compete stipulations.
Coastal's fourth mistake involved problems in its operations.
The company lacked basic financial controls and had inadequate in-
formation systems, which led to the insufficient integration of
physician practices. 365 Individual physician practices used different
financial systems which resulted in de-centralized control of spending
356. See id.
357. See Deogun, supra note 336, at A6.
358. See id.
359. See Lowes, supra note 332, at 32.
360. See Harreld, supra note 348, at 47.
361. See Deogun, supra note 336, at A6.
362. See Harreld, supra note 348, at 47.
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and increased costs.366 Inadequate systems also led to slow access to
information by physicians.367 Coastal was not able to execute its
management expertise in the various physician practices, since many
doctors wanted to "run the show," causing many of them to be poorly368
run. For instance, physicians that were put on salary no longer had
the incentive to pull in business. In addition, the management team
was slow to react to its financial problems, and at one point waited
ten months after their financial problems were made public to engage
turnaround specialists.369
Finally, Coastal maintained a very high price earnings (P/E) mul-
tiple while experiencing operating cash flow problems, which enabled
them to buy cash flow with stock versus cash.370 When Coastal ac-
quired a physician practice and its associated cash flows, they were
371
then able to include Coastal stock as part of the purchase price.
The physicians received attractive stock, and Coastal did not need to
go to lenders for acquisition financing.3n Therefore, the financial
plans that lenders typically require may not have been developed,
since Coastal did not need to seek debt acquisition financing. How-
ever, Wall Street expected even greater earnings to avoid dilution of
the issued stock and justify the high PIE. Many PPMs currently carry
high P/E multiples, which should make lenders wary that the bottom
may fall out of this segment.373
366. See id.
367. See Lowes, supra note 332, at 33. Access to information took as long as three
months at times. See id.
368. See Deogun, supra note 336, at A6. This was a key issue since one of the reasons
physicians join PPMs is access to management expertise, and management expertise en-
ables the PPM to achieve efficiencies at the physician practice level.
369. See Marshall, Control, supra note 352, at 2F.
370. As of 1994, Coastal's P/E ratio was 29.2. COASTAL HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC.,
COMPANY REPORT (1994). When Coastal bought its physician practices, the doctor re-
ceived cash or a combination of cash and stock. The amount of stock offered ranged from
fifty percent to eighty percent of the purchase price. Generally, the doctor had to wait
two years to sell the stock. See Lowes, supra note 332, at 34-36. When Coastal stock was
trading at a high price, with a high price to earnings multiple, their stock gave them great
purchasing power.
371. See Coastal's Uncertain Future, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 8, 1996, at D4.
372. Lenders may benefit from this scenario since physicians may be more hesitant to
accept stock compensation for their practices, resulting in the need for more cash and
stock combinations in the purchase price.
373. As of the third quarter 1996, the trailing price to earnings industry average for
PPMs was fifty-five as compared to twenty for the Standard & Poor 500. See NA-
TIONSBANK 3RD QUARTER, supra note 14, at 21.
[Vol. I
HEALTH CARE RISK ANALYSIS
VI. CONCLUSION
Health care is an evolving industry in which participants seek
ways to control costs while concurrently providing high quality and
accessible health care to the American people. The uncertainty of
the future in light of the volatility of the past makes the health care
industry risky. However, the uncertainty may be thought of as an
opportunity to those companies that engage in thoughtful analysis
and proceed with caution. Lenders and attorneys need to maintain
awareness of the health care industry's business, industry, legal, and
regulatory risks, especially the HMO and PPM segments, which may
reduce the profitability of health care companies.
When assessing a health care company, lenders should consider
legal and regulatory areas of risk in addition to industry and financial
risks. Medicare and Medicaid reform is just around the corner as the
federal government seeks to balance the budget, and the outcome is
highly uncertain. Since Medicare and Medicaid receivables usually
account for a significant portion of health care receivables, the out-
come of this reform will have a significant impact on HMOs and
PPMs. Furthermore, the law continues to evolve in areas such as
ERISA, Antitrust, and Fraud and Abuse. Each of these areas must
be monitored closely in order to determine the ultimate impact on
the financial viability of HMOs and PPMs in the health care industry.
Moreover, as attorneys counsel their clients and draft agree-
ments, they should not only consider the legal and regulatory risks,
but also the financial drivers and industry trends. HMOs contract
with employers and providers, while PPMs contract with HMOs and
physicians. These contracts result in obligations for each party. If
these obligations cost too much or allow the incoming revenue of an
organization to be reduced, the profitability of the HMO or PPM can
be jeopardized. Therefore, attorneys should understand manage-
ment's strategy and concerns so that all contracts will afford
management the necessary protections needed in a volatile and un-
certain future.
DEBRA S. WOOD'
' The Author wishes to thank Andy Bressler, NationsBank Health Care Industry
Analyst, for his support and industry knowledge and Executive Editor Gene Davis for his
commitment and support.
3651997]
